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AbstrAct
In strawson’s “Freedom and resentment”, the 
idea of the reactive attitudes is used to provide a 
corrective for an over-intellectualised picture of 
moral responsibility and of the moral life gener-
ally. but strawson also tells us that in reasoning 
with someone our attitude towards them must 
be reactive. taking up that thought, I suggest 
that strawson has provided us with a corrective 
for an over-intellectualised picture of rational-
ity. Drawing on a Wittgensteinian conception of 
the relation between thought and its expression, 
I argue that participation in a form of engage-
ment with others that is reactive in strawson’s 
sense is a condition of rationality. 
Keywords: strawson, Wittgenstein, expression, 
attitude to a person
1.
P.F. strawson introduces the idea of the 
reactive attitudes in part to remind us 
just how far natural human feelings like 
resentment and gratitude commit us to 
seeing each other as free and responsible 
agents.1 This is not a commitment we 
could be argued out of, strawson insists, 
and if we were somehow to lose these nat-
ural human feelings, we would have lost 
something that is central to our humanity 
and to the possibility of ordinary human 
relationships, and something that is “an 
essential part of the moral life as we know 
it” (strawson 1974, p. 23). but the reactive 
attitudes are not confined to the sphere of 
the moral, for strawson also tells us that 
If your attitude towards someone 
is wholly objective [i.e. not at all 
reactive], then though you may 
fight him, you cannot quarrel with 
him, and though you may talk to 
him, even negotiate with him, you 
1 Strawson 1974. 
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cannot reason with him. You can at most pretend to quarrel, or to reason, with 
him. (strawson 1974, p. 9)
The inclusion of reasoning on this list might surprise us, for we might have expected it 
to be the ‘objective’ attitude, with which strawson contrasts the reactive attitudes, that 
is the attitude of reason or rationality, both theoretical and practical. (His examples of 
objective attitudes include both scientific curiosity and instrumental calculation.) Yet 
in reasoning with someone, strawson tells us, our attitude to our fellow reasoner must 
be reactive. to view someone in a wholly objective light, he implies, would be to with-
draw from our engagement with them, not just as a human being but also as a rational 
being.
We should not be surprised that, having first argued that taking a reactive attitude to-
wards someone is part of treating them as free and responsible, strawson should then 
want to say the same about treating them as a rational being. (Hume may be the most 
obvious influence at work in “Freedom and resentment”, but kant is never far away.) 
but how exactly are we to understand the implied connection between reactivity and 
rationality? strawson’s main concern in “Freedom and resentment” is to provide a cor-
rective for what he sees as an over-intellectualised picture of moral responsibility and of 
the moral life generally. I want to suggest that he has also provided us with a corrective 
for—strange as it may sound—an over-intellectualised picture of rationality. Drawing 
on a Wittgensteinian conception of the relation between thought and its expression, I 
will argue that the possibility of rationality, in the sense in which that is a distinctively 
human characteristic, depends upon our participation in a form of engagement with 
others that is reactive in strawson’s sense.2
2.
We might have less difficulty seeing what reasoning is supposed to have in common 
with resentment if we had a more secure grasp of what strawson means by a reactive 
attitude. but this is where many readers have seen a difficulty, and it might seem that 
the inclusion of reasoning on the list of activities requiring a reactive attitude only makes 
it harder to figure out what his diverse examples are supposed to have in common.3 
strawson’s explicit remarks fall short of an actual definition of the term ‘reactive’, and 
Jonathan bennett’s instructive attempt to devise one for him ends in an admission of fail-
2 strawson himself holds back from claiming that the reactive attitudes are essential to rationality. He grants that 
“it might be said” that we get closer to being purely rational creatures by minimising the role of the reactive at-
titudes, commenting only that “it would not necessarily be rational to choose to be more purely rational than we 
are”. strawson 1974, p. 13.
3 It is significant that Jay Wallace, in developing his own neo-Strawsonian account of responsibility, chooses to work 
with a narrow definition of ‘reactive’ which excludes some of Strawson’s own examples, including the case of reason-
ing; Wallace 1994, ch. 2.
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ure.4 but we will find that strawson has left us with enough hints for present purposes, 
and the inclusion of reasoning turns out to be a helpful clue to the general character of 
the reactive attitudes.
When introducing the idea of a reactive attitude, Strawson first reminds us of
the very great importance that we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards 
us of other human beings, and the great extent to which our personal feelings 
and reactions depend upon our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions. 
(strawson 1974, p. 5) 
Gratitude and resentment, for example, are
essentially natural human reactions to the good will or the ill will or indifference 
of others towards us, as displayed in their attitudes and actions. (strawson 1974, 
p.10)
but not all reactive attitudes reflect a concern with the attitudes of others towards our-
selves. ‘Personal’ reactive attitudes like gratitude and resentment have their ‘vicarious 
or impersonal analogues’ in moral approval and disapproval, which for strawson are 
equally natural human reactions to good will, ill will or indifference shown towards 
third parties. Nor is a concern with good or ill will a defining feature of the reactive 
attitudes. As Jonathan bennett has pointed out, and as strawson quickly conceded, the 
scope and grounds of moral disapproval are not confined to a concern with ill will or 
lack of consideration.5 The inclusion of reasoning and quarrelling among the activities 
requiring a reactive attitude reinforces that line of thought and pushes it further. The 
reactive attitudes are not confined to reactions to ill will, and nor are they confined to 
reactions to the ‘attitudes and intentions’ of others. Where a dispute concerns a ques-
tion of truth, what each party is reacting to in the relevant sense will presumably be 
the view or opinion of the other on the question in dispute. Thus for strawson’s own 
purposes, we need to conceive of the reactive attitudes more broadly than some of his 
own formulations might suggest. We need to think of them as a certain kind of attitude 
towards the attitudes and opinions of others.6 but what kind? What distinguishes a 
reactive attitude towards someone else’s attitude or opinion from an objective attitude 
towards that same attitude or opinion?
Bennett helpfully reminds us of the close connection between the idea of a mental attitude 
and the idea of a physical attitude or posture, and of the way in which the latter suggests 
4 bennett 1980, pp. 38-39.
5 Bennett 1980, p. 45 and Strawson 1980, p. 266. 
6 I am ignoring self-directed reactive attitudes like guilt or shame (strawson 1974, p. 15), believing that we first 
need to get clear about the nature of other-directed reactive attitudes.
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a readiness for action of one sort or another (e.g. a threatening posture). A reactive atti-
tude, he suggests, is “essentially a posture of the mind which is apt for inter-action of a 
certain kind”.7 But what kind of interaction? What makes a response to another human 
being a reactive response? This is where Bennett declares himself defeated. Strawson’s 
remark that a reactive attitude is an ‘attitude of involvement or participation in a hu-
man relationship’8 is clearly important, but it is not immediately helpful, given the great 
variety of interactions that could be described in these terms, not all of which Strawson 
would want to regard as involving a reactive attitude. (Bennett cites the relationship 
between therapist and patient, which for Strawson involves a degree of detachment and 
objectivity.) In any case, we might have hoped that the idea of a reactive attitude would 
help us get clearer about what we understand by a human relationship. A more direct 
pointer to what makes a response reactive is the importance that Strawson attaches to a 
contrast between responses which are expressions of our attitudes and responses which 
are ‘calculated’. Referring to condemnation and punishment and “all those practices 
which express or manifest our moral attitudes”, Strawson urges us to remember that 
these practices, and their reception, the reactions to them, really are expressions 
of our moral attitudes and not merely devices we calculatingly employ for 
regulative purposes. (strawson 1974, p. 25) 
If these practices and reactions were merely devices we calculatingly employ, then our 
attitude to those we address would be the objective attitude of instrumental calculation, 
a concern with consequences and costs and benefits. A reactive response, by contrast, 
is an expression of our attitude, which I take to be a remark both about the meaning of 
our response and, connectedly, about its motivation. A reactive response reflects (not a 
calculation of consequences but) simply a desire or disposition to give expression to our 
attitude, a desire to give expression to the way we see things. to be in the grip of a particu-
lar reactive attitude, to feel resentful or disapproving for example, is (inter alia) to see the 
adequate expression of our attitude as an end in itself—and as something that may call for 
deeds as well as words, depending on our sense of the seriousness of the matter. recall, 
too, that a reactive attitude is a response to the attitudes of others as expressed in their 
words or deeds. A reactive attitude, we can say, is a posture of the mind apt for a specifi-
cally expressive kind of interaction with others. 
Let us come back now to the ‘very great importance’ that we attach to the attitudes and 
opinions of others. strawson is not, of course, suggesting that we possess a detached, 
calculating grasp of their importance to us. rather, our grasp of their importance is 
something more immediate and primitive than that. Our proneness to the reactive atti-
tudes amounts to a sensitivity on our part to the attitudes and opinions of others, a sen-
7 bennett 1980, p. 34.
8 strawson 1974, p. 9.
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sitivity manifested directly in the response those attitudes and opinions provoke from 
us. It is worth noting the way in which this sensitivity is shaped by our own attitudes 
and opinions. Whether and in what way I am provoked by your attitude depends, not 
only on the nature of your attitude, but also on the nature of my own attitude (not to 
you but) to the object of your attitude. For example, whether I am morally indignant at 
your attitude to tax evasion will depend on my own attitude to tax evasion. In express-
ing my indignation at your attitude to tax evasion, I also express my own, conflicting 
attitude towards tax evasion and my rejection of your attitude. Whatever else it does 
or seeks to do, my expression of disapproval challenges your attitude to tax evasion 
and affirms my own. resentment, too, can be understood as reflecting an underlying 
conflict of attitude: I see my interests and dignity as being of the first importance, while 
you seem to see them as being of no importance at all. In expressing my resentment, I 
challenge your view of the importance of my interests and dignity and affirm my own. 
In each case we find the same broad pattern of expressive response. Faced with words 
or deeds of yours which express an attitude towards x in conflict with my own, I am 
disposed to respond by expressing my own attitude towards x. In doing so, I challenge 
your attitude to x and affirm my own.9 That is the primary significance of my response, 
and the sense in which it amounts to engaging in a form of interaction with you. 
Of course, not all reactive attitudes fit this particular pattern of response; think of grati-
tude and moral approval. but perhaps the reactive attitudes which don’t fit this pattern 
can be understood as corresponding to some other intelligible pattern or patterns of 
expressive response to a person. (For example, we might expect agreement in attitude 
or opinion to be valued and even celebrated.) What the reactive attitudes all share, we 
might conjecture, is an urge or readiness to engage expressively, in this or that way, 
with the person in question. However, a fully general definition of the reactive attitudes 
is less important for present purposes than a better understanding of those attitudes 
which do fit the above pattern—let us call them the negative reactive attitudes. They 
are of particular interest in part because it is negative attitudes like resentment and 
blame that we are most tempted to think we would be better off without.10 The way 
we have characterised these cases goes beyond strawson’s own discussion in drawing 
attention to the role played by one’s own first order attitude to the object of the other’s 
attitude (e.g. one’s own attitude to tax evasion). It is this that allows us to see our re-
sponse as a challenge to the other’s attitude and an affirmation of one’s own. It allows 
us to see resentment and disapproval, and the negative reactive attitudes generally, as 
manifestations of disagreement of one sort or another. And that in turn helps us to see 
why strawson included quarrelling and reasoning among the activities that require a 
reactive attitude. We have already noted how the inclusion of quarrelling and reason-
9 This is not to say that you are my only intended audience. being sensitive to the attitudes of others in general, I 
may be concerned that no one else should follow your lead, and keen to enlist the support of others against you. I 
may want the world to know that I reject your attitude. 
10 For examples of this temptation, see sommers 2007, Galen strawson 1986, ch. 6.6, and skinner 1971.
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ing forces us to think of the reactive attitudes as attitudes, not just towards the attitudes 
of others, but also towards their views and opinions; and our present way of thinking 
about resentment and moral disapproval makes this a very natural move. Using the 
term ‘view’ in a suitably broad sense, we might restate the pattern of response which 
distinguishes the negative reactive attitudes as follows:
Faced with words or deeds of yours which express a view of x in conflict with my 
own, I am disposed to respond by expressing my own view of x. In doing so, I 
challenge your view of x and affirm my own. 
Thus to be prone to the negative reactive attitudes is to be disposed to challenge views 
one sees as mistaken or inappropriate (or some of them at least). strawson doesn’t him-
self speak of challenges, but he does associate the reactive attitudes with the making 
of a demand—most centrally, though presumably not exclusively, a demand for good 
will.11 We may also find it natural to speak here of a demand for respect, or for recogni-
tion. but the demand most immediately suggested by the above pattern of expressive 
response, the demand that is implicit in the act of challenge, is the demand that others 
see things as we do, the demand (as we see it) that others see things aright. 
3.
It is not difficult to see that the pattern of response which characterises the negative 
reactive attitudes is also a feature of the activity of reasoning with someone. We would 
hardly be serious if we didn’t express our own view on the matter in dispute and chal-
lenge the expression of views we see as mistaken. And these responses to the other 
party should come naturally to us, as a direct expression of our concern that the other 
sees things aright, not as the outcome of some strategic calculation on our part—that 
would be at most pretending to reason with them. Thus reasoning involves, at its core, 
the same pattern of expressive response we find in resentment and moral disapproval. 
In itself that is not enough to show that reasoning involves taking a reactive attitude. 
A reactive attitude is an attitude towards a person, and while what we have described 
is certainly a response to a person, in speaking of what that response expresses we have 
so far spoken only of the expression of views on the matter in dispute. to conclude 
that reasoning involves taking a reactive attitude, we need to be able to see the act of 
challenging the other’s view as also expressing an attitude towards the other as an indi-
vidual. We have no ready name for such an attitude, but that doesn’t mean that none is 
expressed. strawson sees himself as reminding us of the phenomenology of the moral 
life. We need to try to do the same for the activity of reasoning.
11 strawson 1974, pp. 21-22. 
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My challenge to your view says firstly that it matters to me how you see things; you and 
your view are not simply being ignored. to that extent, my response says that I take you 
seriously as someone with a view, that what you have to say is worth challenging. More-
over, the kind of concern with you and your view that my challenge expresses is clearly 
not objective in strawson’s sense. It is not that your view is, for me, an object of scientific 
curiosity, or a possible obstacle to my plans, to be handled strategically. As with resent-
ment and disapproval, the attitude expressed by a challenge made in the course of reason-
ing or debate is one of readiness for a particular form of expressive engagement with the 
other, and with that comes an engaged, non-detached way of seeing the other. I see you as 
mistaken and so as needing to be put right, and not simply for your own benefit. (Nor is 
it that you have committed an offence for which you deserve rebuke.) What you say mat-
ters to me because you have claimed to speak truly, and if that claim goes unchallenged, 
it has been tacitly conceded. I must challenge your view or be taken to accept it. What is 
at stake is what will henceforth be accepted as true, by you and by all concerned. I see you 
and your view as a threat to something that matters to me, a threat to things being seen 
aright. I see you as mistaken and so ‘needing’ to be challenged and brought to see your 
error. Thus my response to you expresses, not just a view on the matter in dispute between 
us, but also an engaged, non-detached way of seeing you. It is this last, this engaged way 
of seeing those with whom one disagrees, that is the counterpart in the present context of 
resentment and moral disapproval, and which qualifies as a negative reactive attitude on 
our present understanding of that class of attitudes. 
I have argued that there are significant analogies between the attitude of one reasoner 
to another and the central strawsonian examples of resentment and moral disapproval, 
analogies that make it appropriate to think of the former, too, as a reactive attitude. 
There are also disanalogies of course, and one is worth noting if only to be clear what 
is not being said about reasoning. The attitude of a reasoner, I have suggested, reflects 
only a forward-looking concern that things should henceforth be seen aright. (No one 
is being rebuked for what they have said, or if they are, we have stopped reasoning 
with them.) As we have seen, resentment and disapproval share this forward-looking 
concern, but they are also backward-looking in that they focus on a past (and perhaps 
ongoing) offence and find their characteristic expression in complaint and rebuke, re-
venge and punishment—none of which have any parallel in the business of reasoning. 
strawson sometimes seems to suggest that all reactive attitudes are backward-looking 
in this sense,12 but that cannot be his considered view if he is serious about including 
reasoning within their scope. (He cannot have intended to describe the attitude of one 
reasoner to another as ‘blame- and praise-related’.) Nor, in saying that the attitude of a 
reasoner is reactive, are we saying that it is an ‘emotional’ attitude—or not essentially so 
at any rate. reasoned disputes can, of course, get heated and anger may surface, but the 
attitude I have described, and which I am suggesting is essential to what is said count-
12 As for example when he refers to them as “blame- and praise-related attitudes”, strawson 1980, p. 266.
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ing as reasoning, is not anger. In any case, there is often nothing particularly emotional 
about resentment and moral disapproval.13 What will be important for strawson is that 
challenging falsehood, like all reactive responses, is one that comes naturally to us; it 
is not a calculated response. It comes naturally to us, not in the sense of being biologi-
cally innate, but rather in the sense that it is a direct response to something we perceive 
as calling for that response—as for example when we move to avoid an obstacle in our 
path or to catch something that falls. A reactive attitude is (inter alia) a way of seeing a 
person that is internally related to a certain way of responding to them. It is thus a way 
of seeing a person that is itself motivating. 
This is not the way analytic philosophers are accustomed to thinking about motivation. 
The usual picture assumes rationality on the part of the agent and insists on a clear 
distinction between world-representing states like beliefs and perceptions, which are 
held to be in themselves motivationally inert, and motivational states proper (desires, 
goals, preferences, values, etc) which are not world-representing. On this picture of 
motivation, no belief or perception is non-contingently connected with any particular 
response to what is perceived or believed. How we respond depends, to the extent that 
we are rational, on what else we happen to believe and what we happen to desire. by 
contrast, the idea of an intrinsically motivating way of seeing things blurs the distinc-
tion between belief and desire and implies a non-contingent connection between per-
ception and response. Thus a reactive motivation excludes, not just calculation in the 
sense of conscious planning or reflection, but belief-desire style rational motivation of 
any kind, even one held to operate at an unconscious level.14 A reactive response does 
not reflect an ‘all things considered’ judgement of what to do for the best. Like a smile 
or a frown, it is a response to a specific individual or circumstance seen as calling for 
that response. In this sense, a reactive response is a less than fully rational response. 
That hardly counts as news, but it may seem to cause problems for the claim that rea-
soning requires a reactive attitude. reasoning with someone is surely an exercise of our 
rational powers, no less than reasoning with or to oneself. can strawson be suggesting 
that the attitude of one reasoner to another is (must be!) such as to compromise the 
rationality of the proceedings? Well he isn’t, of course, because in the relevant sense, 
the rationality of our response is not compromised by it being a reactive response. to 
insist that a fully rational response to one’s fellow reasoner must be under the control 
13 strawson puts it this way: “I am not in the least suggesting that [our reactive responses] are always or commonly 
accompanied by indignant boilings or remorseful pangs; only that we have here a continuum of attitudes and feel-
ings”. (strawson 1974, p.22)
14 It might be objected that what we have here is not a distinct type of motivation at all but simply an odd way 
of speaking which says nothing that can’t be said, and said more clearly, in terms of beliefs and desires. but the 
belief-desire framework does not allow us to say everything we want to say about the reactive attitudes. If we are 
to see resentment or moral disapproval as reflecting a kind of disagreement between self and other, then that dis-
agreement must concern ways of seeing things that are themselves motivating (e.g. that tax avoidance is wrong, 
or that my interests and dignity are of the first importance). to desire different things is not in itself to disagree. 
Motivating perceptions combine with other perceptions and beliefs to form a more complete view of the situation 
we face; desires combine in a different way.
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of belief-desire style practical reason is to misunderstand the activity of reasoning and 
what it requires of us. The reactive attitude specific to reasoning involves, as we have 
seen, a concern with the truth of what is said to the exclusion of other unconnected con-
cerns, which is precisely what reasoning requires of us. That kind of concern with truth 
is a condition of what we are doing counting as reasoning. 
4.
Let us step back now from questions about reasoning, for I want to suggest that there 
is a more fundamental way in which the reactive attitudes are implicated in rationality. 
The same considerations which suggest that the attitude of a reasoner is reactive also 
suggest that the normal attitude of one speaker to another must be reactive, at least in 
so far as the assertoric use of language is part of their repertoire. There are many con-
texts besides reasoning in which to speak at all is to claim to speak truly, and whenever 
such a claim is made, the speaker lays herself open to the possibility of challenge from 
other speakers. Without that possibility of challenge, what is said would not amount 
to a claim to speak truly.15 An uncalculated disposition to express one’s own view and 
challenge mistaken views is surely constitutive, not just of the activity of reasoning, 
but of the assertoric language game as a whole. And with this pattern of response goes 
the same basic phenomenology. In asserting this and challenging that, we manifest a 
concern that things be seen aright. seen through the eyes of that concern, other speak-
ers are potential threats who may need to be challenged, for once again, if mistaken 
views go unchallenged their truth has been tacitly conceded. sometimes this aspect of 
language use remains far in the background, sometimes it erupts into the foreground, 
but in one way or another this engaged and uncalculating way of seeing those with 
whom one disagrees is a feature, not just of reasoning but of any truth-claiming use of 
language. In fact it is a requirement on speakers that their attitude to other speakers be 
reactive in this way, for it is part of the requirement of sincerity. 
The possibility of challenge and dispute is an essential part of the assertoric language 
game, but it is not, of course, the whole of that game. There can be disagreement only 
against a background of very considerable agreement, for in the absence of agreed 
standards of correctness nothing could count as a claim that those standards are met, 
nothing could amount to a claim with which one could disagree. There would also be 
little point in giving expression to our own way of seeing things if that had no tendency 
to induce others to see things that way too. rather we need to think in terms of an 
underlying tendency to accept the expressed views and attitudes of others, a tendency 
amounting, once again, to a sensitivity to those views and attitudes.16 some such ten-
15 I offer more argument for these claims in ross 1989.
16 As Hume observes, “no quality of human nature is more remarkable...than that tendency we have to sympathise 
with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from or even 
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dency to accept what others express is vital, both to the dynamics of the moral life as 
strawson conceives it, and to the dynamics of the assertoric life as we are now conceiv-
ing of it.17 
so the normal attitude of one speaker to another, the attitude of sincerity, is reactive 
in strawson’s sense. My task now is to make the case for seeing the possession of lan-
guage as a condition of rationality. There is more than one way of seeing a connection 
between language and rationality, and more than one way of understanding the idea 
of rationality for these purposes. One familiar approach identifies rationality with con-
cept possession and argues that without language there can be no concepts; but let us 
not get drawn into a debate about the nature of concepts. A more illuminating way of 
thinking of rationality for these purposes is as the achievement of objectivity of attitude 
in strawson’s sense. Notice that this definition puts rationality squarely in conflict with 
reactivity of attitude, as we would expect it to be. Even so, there is nothing paradoxical 
about the suggestion that reactivity of attitude is a condition of, or is involved in, ra-
tionality in this sense. The claim is only that language, and therefore a reactive attitude 
towards other speakers, is a condition of the possibility of taking an objective attitude 
towards that of which we speak. 
5.
My argument for this last claim draws on a Wittgensteinian conception of the relation 
between thought and its expression, though it also amounts to a defence of that concep-
tion in the face of what might seem a fatal counter-example. Wittgenstein’s insistence 
that inner processes require outer criteria is best understood, not as an application of a 
general verificationism to the case of mental states, but rather as a point about the im-
portance of the idea of expression to our idea of the mental. His thought is that it makes 
sense to attribute a given state of mind (e.g. hope or regret) only to creatures capable of 
giving expression to that state of mind. Thus the essence of a state of mind is revealed 
by what we are prepared to count as its expression. The essential thing, the mental state 
itself, is not merely contingently related to the behaviour that gives it expression; rather 
the relationship between a mental state and its expression is an internal relation. On 
this Wittgensteinian conception of the mental, we can attribute objectivity of attitude 
only to a creature capable of behaviour we can recognize as giving expression to such an 
attitude. so our question becomes: what kind of behaviour could amount to a criterial 
expression of an objective attitude? I will now argue that it is only linguistic behaviour 
that is capable of giving expression to such an attitude.
contrary to our own... to this principle we ought to ascribe the great uniformity we may observe in the humours 
and turn of thinking of those of the same nation.” (Hume 1888, book II, Part I, section XI)
17 For a fuller discussion of why we believe what we are told, and of our attitude to other speakers, see ross 1986.
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As an argumentative strategy this may well seem perverse. For many philosophers, the 
problem will be to understand how any behaviour could amount to a criterial expres-
sion of any state of mind. How can the relation between thought and its expression ever 
be internal? As it happens, the reactive attitudes and other motivating ways of seeing 
things (e.g. seeing something as a threat or an obstacle) provide plausible examples 
of the kind of internal relation between thought and its expression that Wittgenstein 
envisages. Where a way of seeing things is itself motivating, there is a non-contingent 
connection between that way of seeing things and the response or responses it moti-
vates. In such cases, we can say, the response amounts to a criterion of (is necessarily 
normally sufficient for) the presence of the corresponding perception. Admittedly, it 
is not immediately obvious how this kind of example of criterial expression can help 
us understand what might count as the criterial expression of an objective attitude. On 
the usual view, an objective way of describing or thinking of something is supposed to 
be precisely unmotivating, detached from all particular concerns or purposes, though 
capable of guiding us in the pursuit of any. (Thus the belief-desire picture of practical 
rationality requires our beliefs to be objective in this sense.) but the case of motivating 
ways of seeing things is more generalisable than it might seem. We need to take a closer 
look at how an internal relation arises in this case. 
The fox sees the farmer’s wife, for he reacts to her presence. but does he see her as a 
farmer’s wife, or only as a potential threat, as something to be avoided? If the fox is in-
clined to flee or to seek cover, and that is his only response to the farmer’s wife, we will 
be inclined to say that he sees her only as a potential threat, for that is all his response 
expresses. It is not that we have established an empirical correlation between seeing 
something as a threat and the response of flight. The point is rather that flight is an 
appropriate response to a (certain kind of) threat. It is because there is an appropriate 
response to the fact of a threat that the perception of a threat is a motivating perception. 
In seeing something as a threat, we see it as something to flee from, as something to 
which flight is an appropriate response. At the same time, it is because flight is an ap-
propriate response to an actual threat that flight is recognizable as an expression of the 
perception of a threat, even if no actual threat exists. In responding appropriately to 
items encountered in its environment, a creature manifests an awareness of those items, 
and what it sees them as is revealed by what its response is appropriate to. Here, then, is 
one way in which an internal relation can arise between thought and action, one way in 
which a response can amount to a criterial expression of a state of mind.
We will shortly consider how this idea might be extended to the case of a linguistic 
response, but let us stay for a moment with non-linguistic responses. The present way 
of thinking about the possibility of criterial expression implies, schematically at least, a 
way of thinking about the content so expressed. to see an object as an α is to treat it, or 
be disposed to treat it, as an α. The content of a creature’s perceptions is revealed by that 
to which its response is an appropriate response. Now this criterion of content implies 
a certain constraint on what is expressible non-linguistically (i.e. wholly independently 
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of language).18 Though the awareness expressed in this way may not always be motivat-
ing in quite the way that an awareness of a threat is motivating, it is fundamentally an 
awareness of the world in action-relevant terms, an awareness of the environment as 
affording this or that possibility of movement, as containing dangers, sources of nour-
ishment, places of shelter or hiding, and so on. It is an ‘involved’ awareness, not at all 
the detached attitude implied in the idea of objectivity of attitude. In fact the awareness 
that is expressed by non-linguistic action is precisely a subjective awareness in the sense 
that everything is seen in relation to the particular needs, concerns, vulnerabilities and 
powers of the subject.19 What constitutes a danger, or an escape route, or food for one 
creature may not be those things for another. The awareness expressible in this way is 
also essentially restricted to the here and now. In short, non-linguistic behaviour can-
not give expression to an objective view of the world. From which it follows, on a Wit-
tgensteinian conception of the mental, that we cannot attribute the capacity for such a 
view to a creature that lacks language.
6.
We are unlikely to need persuading that language is not restricted in its expressive pow-
er in the ways I have claimed non-linguistic action to be restricted. but having appealed 
to a Wittgensteinian conception of the mental in arguing that without language a crea-
ture cannot be credited with objective thought, I need to show that the implications of 
this conception of the mental are different once a creature has language. We must be 
reassured that Wittgenstein’s insistence on an internal relation between thought and its 
expression does not force us to deny the possibility of objective thought to ourselves. 
How, then, can the power of speech make a difference? One way in which speech marks 
an advance on non-linguistic action is in furnishing an expression of thought that is 
detachable from any direct practical response to its object. With language we can speak, 
and thus think, of things in their absence and away from the urgent need for a practical 
response. This kind of detachment from immediate practical concerns is surely a mini-
mum condition of anything counting as ‘thinking’, let alone rational thinking. 
How, though, can the content that language expresses avoid the kind of subject-relativi-
ty that I have claimed constrains what is expressible non-linguistically? We have under-
stood the Wittgensteinian conception of the mental as implying that what an action ex-
presses is a function of that to which it is an appropriate response. How are we to apply 
this criterion of content to the case of language use? In speaking loosely of language as 
18 I will focus here on purposive action rather than, say, non-linguistic expressions of emotion, for I assume it will 
be readily agreed that the latter fail to express an objective attitude. 
19 Thus in describing the awareness expressible in this way as a subjective awareness, I am not saying that it is an 
awareness of the agent’s subjective states. rather it is a subject-centred awareness in which the world is seen in 
subject-relative ways. It is the world that is seen, not the subject. 
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providing us with a way of responding to an object, an alternative to fleeing from it or 
eating it, I am not, of course, imagining us speaking to the object. What I have in mind 
is such activities as describing the object to someone who hasn’t seen it, challenging 
someone else’s description of it, asking the opinion of another about it, making a note 
about it for future reference, and so on. All but the last of these would more naturally be 
described as responses to, or interactions with, other speakers; but what we say to each 
other can be appropriate or inappropriate to how things are in the world of which we 
speak. In the case of non-linguistic action, ‘appropriate’ can only mean ‘appropriate for 
that individual, given her situation, needs, vulnerabilities, etc.’ Thus flight is an appro-
priate response only to the presence of a current threat to the fleeing individual. That 
is why it can express only a subject-relative view of the world. In the case of language 
use, however, ‘appropriate’ can mean ‘true’, and where a response is appropriate in this 
sense, it is a response that is appropriate (in this sense) for anyone to make. Language 
is governed by public standards of appropriate use, and those which concern truth are 
impersonal in a way that (indexicality aside) allows the content of what is expressed to 
be the same for all speakers. It follows that thought expressed linguistically can be free 
of the relativity-to-self that constrains what is expressible non-linguistically.20 I say ‘can 
be’ because it is evident that language can also give expression to more subjective ways 
of seeing things. The attitude we express towards the things of which we speak depends 
in familiar ways on the specifics of what we say. The present claim is only that language 
allows for the possibility of avoiding the kind of subjectivity that constrains what is 
expressible non-linguistically. seen from a Wittgensteinian perspective, it is language 
that opens up the possibility of viewing the world objectively. 
There are of course degrees of objectivity. I am not primarily concerned with the kind 
of objectivity sought in specialised areas of discourse like the natural sciences. I have 
in mind something that language makes routinely available to us, even where it is em-
ployed in the pursuit of here and now practical concerns. (Via methods of measure-
ment, for example, and much of our everyday descriptive vocabulary.) The possibil-
ity of this everyday kind of objectivity is presupposed by the belief-desire picture of 
rational motivation, and indeed by any plausible conception of practical rationality. It 
is equally presupposed by any conception of rational enquiry. to say that we owe the 
possibility of such objectivity to language is, I have argued, to say that we owe it to our 
participation in a form of engagement with others that is reactive in strawson’s sense. 
Thus the possibility of rationality, in the sense in which that is a distinctively human 
characteristic, depends upon our reactive engagement with others. It rests on a type of 
sensibility natural to an expressive being, amounting to a certain kind of sensitivity to 
the views of others. It is natural to think of objectivity of attitude as a particular way of 
seeing the world, but it also involves a particular way of seeing other people. In using 
language to express one’s own view and to challenge the views of others, we manifest a 
20 The claims made in these last few sentences are defended in ross 1989. 
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concern with truth. We can think of the concern with truth thus manifested as facing in 
two directions. On the one hand, it is a concern with what other speakers say and think, 
amounting to a concern that they see things aright. On the other hand, it is a concern 
with the facts, with the world; though it is not the kind of practical concern with the 
world that we could attribute to a creature without language. It has the form, we might 
say, of a concern that the world be correctly described, a concern that it be seen aright. 
Thus the concern with the world and the concern with what others think are, in truth, 
one and the same concern. Yet the image of a concern that faces two ways serves to cap-
ture the intimate connection between the achievement of an objective view of the world 
and our natural commitment to a reactive view of our fellow human beings. 
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